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Abstract
Two studies investigated how behavioral information about the morality or intelligence
of another person influences impressions, expectations of cooperative behavior, and own
cooperation in a mixed-motive interdependence situation. Consistent with the morality-
importance hypothesis, results revealed that morality information influenced impres-
sions, expectations of other’s cooperative behavior, as well as own cooperation more
strongly than intelligence information, and led to greater confidence in expectations and
better recall. Consistent with the negativity eect hypothesis, negative information
about morality and intelligence had more impact on impressions and interaction-
relevant measures than positive information. An additional finding was that people
overall expected more cooperation from others than they were willing to display
themselves, and that this dierence was especially pronounced for unintelligent and
moral targets. Explanations and implications are discussed from a behavioral-adaptive
perspective on impression formation. Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
One reason that people form impressions of each other is that impressions help us to
anticipate others’ behavior, and to respond to it eectively. When you meet some-
body for the first time, it is important to know whether or not this person will adopt a
favorable, cooperative attitude toward you. Your first impression of the person helps
you to answer this question, and to decide how to behave yourself. This function of
impression formation is especially important if you are dependent on someone. For
example, when someone is able to aect your outcomes, you will pay more attention
to this person than you might have done otherwise, and you will really be motivated
to form an accurate, individuated impression of him or her (e.g. Berscheid, Graziano,
Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher &
Fiske, 1990).
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In studies of the eects of such outcome dependency on impression formation, two
aspects have received little attention. First, this research generally does not involve
measures of behavior toward the person who is the object of the impression.
Although it is assumed either implicitly or explicitly that outcome dependency—or its
mutual form, interdependence—increases attention and accuracy motivation because
‘thinking is for doing’ (Fiske, 1992; see also e.g. Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Heider, 1958;
Jones & Thibaut, 1958), it is not tested whether or how these impressions actually
influence behavior. Participants in such paradigms remain ‘one-way mirror
observers’.
Second, studies on outcome dependency generally investigated either cooperative
or competitive dependence, and neglected so-called mixed-motive situations, in which
the needs and interests of the persons concerned partly correspond and partly conflict
(see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; an exception, however, is found in De Dreu, Yzerbyt &
Leyens, 1995). Such situations are important not only because they are quite common
in everyday life, but also because they make that one’s impression of the other person
really matters. Because these situations provide no clues as to whether to view the
other as a ‘partner’ or as an ‘opponent’, it becomes especially useful to form an
impression of the other person and of the behavior one may expect from him or her, in
order to decide how to behave toward this person. We chose to confine the current
research to a specific mixed-motive interdependence context: a two-person social
dilemma. This is an interdependence situation in which noncooperation results in
greater outcomes for self than cooperation, irrespective of the other’s behavior, but in
which mutual cooperation yields greater outcomes for both persons than does mutual
noncooperative behavior.
AN INTERDEPENDENCE ANALYSIS OF EVALUATIVE
PERSON INFORMATION
In the current research, we investigated how people make use of information about
another person in a mixed-motive interdependence situation, to form impressions,
infer cooperative or non-cooperative intentions of interdependent others, and decide
on one’s own cooperative or non-cooperative behavior. In two experiments, we
provided people with information about past behaviors of interdependent others,
systematically varying its descriptive meaning (whether the information is about
morality or intelligence) and its evaluative meaning (whether the information is
positive, negative, or neutral), Our purpose was to examine the relative importance
of morality versus intelligence information, and of positive versus negative
information.
Morality versus Intelligence Information
People tend to organize person impressions along two evaluative dimensions: Social
desirability and intellectual desirability (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan,
1968). The first of these dimensions is represented by person characteristics denoting a
tendency to be good or bad to other people (see Peeters & Czapinski’s, 1990, concept
306 E. N. M. De Bruin and P. A. M. Van Lange
Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 29, 305–328 (1999)
of other-profitability), and includes traits such as ‘(dis)honest’ and ‘(in)considerate’.
We operationalized this dimension as morality. The second dimension is represented
by person characteristics denoting abilities and capacities (or ecacy in attaining
one’s goals; cf. Peeters & Czapinski’s, 1990, concept of self-profitability), and includes
traits such as ‘(un)skilful’ and ‘(un)intelligent’. This dimension was operationalized as
intelligence.
In a mixed-motive interdependence situation, we expect morality information to be
more important for a social perceiver than intelligence information (morality-
importance hypothesis). As a social dilemma involves a decision between some gain
for self at a larger cost for another person, an important question is whether you can
trust the other person to cooperate (e.g. Deutsch, 1973; cf. Apfelbaum, 1974). In this
respect, morality is much more diagnostic than intelligence. As morality can be
defined as a sense of obligation toward others and the relative absence of harming
others (Deutsch, 1982; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), one can trust moral persons to
be cooperative (and immoral persons to be noncooperative). Intelligence information,
on the other hand, is ambiguous in this respect. We can only trust that a smart person
will cooperate, if we assume that this person endorses collective rationality (trying to
get the best outcomes for all) and not individual rationality (trying to get the best
outcomes for the self; cf. Van Lange, Liebrand & Kuhlman, 1990; Van Lange &
Liebrand, 1991a; Van Vugt, Van Lange, & Meertens, 1996). On the basis of intellig-
ence information alone, we cannot reliably infer the basis for rationality (individual
or collective) that a person endorses.
Another line of reasoning supporting the morality-importance hypothesis relies on
the other-profitable nature of morality and the self-profitability of intelligence. In an
interaction situation, a social perceiver will readily interpret the general meaning of
morality information, ‘good or bad for other people’, as ‘good or bad for me’.
However, the consequences of another person’s intelligence are less clear. If someone
is intelligent, and thus able to be ‘good for him or herself’ (i.e. self-profitability), a
social perceiver still does not know whether he or she will find cooperation or
noncooperation the best way to achieve good outcomes.
In sum, we predicted that information about the morality of an interdependent
other would influence impressions and interaction-relevant measures (i.e. expected
and own cooperation) more strongly than would intelligence information. We
expected that intelligence eects would have the same direction as morality eects.
Because of the social costs associated with noncooperation, we expected that most
people would relate intelligence to cooperation. However, according to the above
analysis, we expected these intelligence eects to be less pronounced.
Positive versus Negative Information
Generally, people assign greater attention and weight to negative than to positive
information. Originally, this negativity eect was explained by considering the
relatively benign global beliefs people hold about their social environment as a
background in which negative information stands out as the ‘figure’ (Fiske, 1980;
Kanouse & Hanson, 1972). Other cognitive explanations stress the role of terms of
behavior-trait schemata (Reeder & Brewer, 1979), or diagnosticity of informational
cues (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987, 1989)—for example, immoral behaviors are
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more diagnostic in determining the morality of a person than are moral behaviors,
because only immoral people are assumed to be willing to act immorally. More
recently, motivational explanations have been advanced that consider attending to
negative information as functional because it prepares people to respond eectively to
threatening circumstances, like, for example, negative outcomes caused by an
immoral person (for further evidence and reasoning, see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990;
Pratto & John, 1991; Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992; Taylor, 1991; Vonk & Van
Knippenberg, 1994; Wojciszke, Brycz, & Borkenau, 1993).
The current research seeks to extend prior research on evaluative asymmetries,
advancing the prediction that negativity eects for morality are revealed not only in
impressions but also in interaction-relevant measures (negativity eect hypothesis).
Specifically, we predicted that negative morality information about an interdependent
other would exert greater influence on the formation of global evaluative impressions,
expectations of the other’s cooperation, and own cooperative behavior, than positive
morality information. For intelligence information, we advanced no formal
predictions. Although positivity eects are sometimes found for intelligence (e.g.
Reeder & Fulks, 1980), it may also be argued that in an actual interaction context,
attending to negative intelligence information is functional, because unintelligent
people may be perceived as unpredictable, and hence as providing a risky, dangerous
environment.
STUDY 1
Participants were paired with a number of (fictitious) other persons successively, who
were described by only one behavioral item that was either moral, immoral,
intelligent, unintelligent, or neutral (i.e. not related to either morality or intelligence).
The neutral targets served as comparisons for both morality and intelligence targets,
and enabled us to test for evaluative asymmetries. Participants engaged in a social
dilemma task with these targets. Dependent variables were (1) global impressions of
the target person, (2) degree of cooperation expected from the other person, (3)
confidence in expectations, (4) own degree of cooperation, and (5) free recall of
behavioral information.
We advanced two sets of hypotheses. First, based on the morality-importance
hypothesis, we predicted that eects of morality information (moral versus immoral
targets1) on global evaluative impressions, expected cooperation, and own coopera-
tion would be more pronounced overall than eects of intelligence information
(intelligent versus unintelligent targets). Also, we predicted more confidence expressed
in expectations based on morality information rather than intelligence information,
and better recall of morality behaviors versus intelligence behaviors.
Second, we predicted that favorability of global impressions and levels of expected
and own cooperation would decrease for targets described by more negative behavior
for both evaluative dimensions. For morality, based on the negativity eect hypo-
thesis, we predicted the dierences between immoral and neutral targets to be more
1For reasons of eciency, we will refer to targets described by moral (immoral, etc.) behavior as ‘moral
(immoral, etc.) targets’ throughout the text.
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pronounced than the dierences between neutral and moral targets. We did not
advance a formal prediction regarding negativity or positivity eects for intelligence.
Finally, in order to examine the interactional consequences of the information at
another level, we explored whether dierences between cooperation expected from the
target and own cooperation varied with target type.
Method
Overview
The experiment was run self-paced on personal computers in individual cubicles.
First, the social dilemma task was explained. Participants then engaged in this two-
person task with a number of (fictitious) target persons successively, each described
by a moral, immoral, intelligent, unintelligent or neutral behavioral description. After
a filler task, participants were asked to write down all behaviors they could recall on a
sheet of paper, Finally, participants were debriefed and paid for participation.
Participants and Design
A total of 125 students at the Free University (81 women, 44 men), recruited by means
of an announcement in the university newspaper, participated in this study. The
within-participants design included morality of other (moral versus neutral versus
immoral) and intelligence of other (intelligent versus neutral versus unintelligent) as
within-participant factors.
Procedure
The social dilemma task Participants were told that the study was a decision-making
task involving choices between options that would aect the number of points they
would get and the number of points that other persons would get. They were told that
for every choice they made, they would be paired with another person, about whom
they would receive some information before they had to make their choices. They
were not told with how many persons they would be paired. The social dilemma task
was adopted from prior research (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange &
Liebrand, 1991a,b). Participants were told that upon each new pairing with a person,
this person would have four yellow points, each of which was worth 50 Dutch cents to
him or her, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the participant. They themselves would have
four blue points upon each new pairing, each worth 50 Dutch cents to the participant,
but worth 100 Dutch cents to the other person. Participants were told that although
the points represented money, the study would not involve additional monetary
payos. They were told that their task was to decide how many, points—none, one,
two, three, or four—they would give to the other person, and that the other person
would decide how many points he or she would give to them. It was explained that
every point transferred results in a 50 cent loss for the giver and a 100 cent gain for the
receiver. A few calculation examples followed, and participants were provided with a
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table containing the 5 5 payo matrix for the task, displaying the outcomes for
both themselves and the other person for all possible combinations of own and
other’s choices. Participants could consult this table throughout the experiment.
Additionally, a 10-item questionnaire to check participants’ comprehension of the
task was administered, the results of which showed that all participants compre-
hended the task structure. Following explanation and a comprehension check, it was
repeated that upon each pairing with a new person, the participant would again have
four blue points, and the other person four yellow points.
Half of the participants first engaged in the social dilemma task with all targets
successively, and thereafter rated their global impression of all targets successively.
The other half rated their global impression of a target, engaged in the social dilemma
task with this target, and then went on to the next target. Preliminary analyses showed
no consistent pattern of eects for order, so this variable will not be further discussed.
Manipulation of morality and intelligence Participants were told that they would
receive information about recent behavior of the persons with whom they would be
paired, by noting that such information may facilitate decision making;2 otherwise
they would know nothing about the other persons. They were also told that these
persons would not receive any information about the participant.3 The behavioral
descriptions were selected from a pretest study, in which 50 students rated 73
descriptions of approximately equal lengths. Half of the students first rated the
morality of all behaviors (ÿ4 very immoral, 4 very moral), and then their
diagnosticity for morality (0 says very little about the morality of the person,
8 says very much about the morality of the person). The other half rated the
intelligence (ÿ4 very unintelligent, 4 very intelligent) and the diagnosticity for
intelligence (0 says very little about the intelligence of the person, 8 says very
much about the intelligence of the person) of the behaviors. Pretest participants were
told that all behaviors had been observed among dierent persons. The descriptions
were presented in two random orders. Counterbalanced with order, the behaviors
rated by half of the pretest participants were displayed by male actors. The other half
rated the same behaviors displayed by female actors. Order and gender of actor had
no eects on the pretest ratings.
In order to manipulate morality and intelligence as independently as possible, we
selected moral items scoring 2.50 or higher on morality, 6.00 or higher on
diagnosticity for morality, and scoring at least one scale point lower on intelligence
and diagnosticity for intelligence, respectively (all these dierences were significant at
p5 0.05). Immoral items scored ÿ2.50 or lower on morality, 6.00 or higher on
diagnosticity for morality, and at least one scale point higher and one scale point
lower on intelligence and diagnosticity for intelligence, respectively. Intelligent and
unintelligent items were selected using parallel criteria. Finally, we selected neutral
2We agree with an anonymous reviewer that telling the participants that the information they received
would ‘facilitate decision making’ might conjure up demand characteristics, in that respondents might
come to see the information as relevant and applicable to the interaction context. However, this procedure
does not in any way imply that morality information is more relevant and applicable to the interaction
context than intelligence information.
3We did not include a check of potential suspicion of the procedure, but upon debriefing, several
participants expressed their surprise that the ‘other persons’ had not been real persons. We think that this
is significant, because in our experience, participants are generally inclined to display hindsight bias and
say that they ‘knew it all along’.
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items scoring between ÿ1.50 and  1.50 on both morality and intelligence and less
than 4.00 on both diagnosticity scales, and not diering in morality and intelligence,
nor in diagnosticity for these dimensions. These neutral behavioral descriptions made
it possible to test negativity eects, by serving as comparisons for targets described by
moral, immoral, intelligent, or unintelligent behavior. The behaviors are listed in the
Appendix.
Participants were shown one of these behaviors per target person. For every new
target, the behavioral description appeared on the screen, preceded by the message
‘You are now paired with a person who displayed the following behavior last week’.
The behavioral description remained on the screen while the participants were asked
to rate their global impression of the target, and to indicate their expectations,
confidence in expectations, and own cooperation. Participants were paired with
17 targets: 3 persons described by a moral behavior, 3 by an immoral behavior, 3 by
an intelligent behavior, 3 by an unintelligent behavior, and 5 by a neutral behavior.
An additional neutral target, presented first, served as a practice trial and was
excluded from the analyses. The order in which participants were paired with these 17
targets was randomized separately for each participant.
We took several measures to minimize the possibility that specific characteristics of
the behaviors would influence the results. First, we included relatively more neutral
behaviors because these were not domain-specific, and therefore more of them were
needed in order to form a representative sample of possible behaviors not related to
morality or intelligence. Also, we employed two distinct sets of 17 targets; that is, we
had selected 34 behaviors in total, and varied Target Set as a between-participants
variable. Furthermore, we systematically varied target gender. Counterbalanced with
other variations, half of the targets were male in one version, and female in the other
version, and vice versa. Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects
including gender of participants, target set, or target gender version. Hence, these
variables will not be further discussed.
Free recall task Finally, after a filler task, participants were asked to write down all
behavioral descriptions they could remember on a sheet of paper, in words as close as
possible to the original formulation. They were asked to spend at least 5 and at most
8 minutes completing this task. The coding of the recalled behaviors was not dicult,
because the participants’ wording of the recalled behaviors was generally very similar
to the original wording. Accordingly, we did not obtain interrater-reliability; one
observer just counted the number of behaviors recalled (for similar procedures, see
Liebrand, Messick, & Wolters, 1986; cf. Srull, 1981).
Dependent Measures
Participants were asked how many points—none, one, two, three, or four—they
expected a target to give to them in the social dilemma task (expected cooperation),
how confident they were about this expectation (ÿ2 not at all confident, 2 very
confident), and how many points—none, one, two, three, or four—they gave to the
target (own cooperation). Also, they rated their global impression of the target on a
5-point scale (ÿ2 very negative, 2 very positive). Finally, the number of moral,
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immoral, intelligent, unintelligent, and neutral behavioral descriptions recalled were
counted.
Results and Discussion
For all dependent measures except the recall data, mean scores were computed across
the moral, the immoral, the intelligent, the unintelligent, and the neutral targets. The
unit of analysis for the recall data was the proportion of correctly recalled behaviors
per category. These data were subjected to analyses of variance with target as a 5-level
within-participant variable. The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 1,
together with the mean scores for the five target types on the dependent measures and
the results of post-hoc contrast tests. As can be seen, the main eect of Target was
highly significant for all dependent measures. Further, we see that for both morality
and intelligence information, targets described by positive behavior generally elicited
more favourable impressions, and made participants expect and display greater levels
of cooperation than targets described by negative behavior. The only exception was
that targets’ intelligence did not aect expected cooperation. Also, participants
expressed more confidence in expectations based on morality or intelligence informa-
tion rather than neutral information; moreover, moral and immoral behaviors were
recalled better than neutral behaviors. Intelligent and unintelligent behaviors were
recalled relatively poorly. (Results for the dierence between expected and own
cooperation will be discussed below.) But were morality eects significantly more
pronounced than intelligence eects, as was predicted? And did negative information
have more impact than positive information? These questions were addressed by
computing a priori contrasts,4 setting alpha at 0.01 to avoid capitalization on chance
eects.
The Importance of Morality
The morality-importance hypothesis stated that the importance of morality over
intelligence information would be manifested in two ways. First, morality informa-
tion would have a greater impact on global impressions, and expected and own
cooperation than intelligence information. Second, morality information would lead
to more confidence in expectations and better recall than intelligence information.
For global impressions, expected cooperation, and own cooperation, we contrasted
the dierence between moral and immoral targets against the dierence between
intelligent and unintelligent targets. For all three dependent variables, we found
stronger eects for morality than for intelligence. First, both morality and intelligence
information aected global impressions (relative to neutral information, see Table 1),
but the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 2.74) was
more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets
(a mean dierence of 1.24; t[124] 17.01, p5 0.0001). Second, as can be seen in
Table 1, intelligence did not aect levels of expected cooperation. Clearly, then, the
4The negativity eect hypothesis was also tested by means of polynomial contrasts (i.e. by computing
linear and quadratic trends). These analyses produced the same results as the analyses reported in the text.
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dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 2.12) was more
pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean
dierence of 0.00; t[124] 17.99, p5 0.0001). And finally, both morality and
intelligence information aected own cooperation (see Table 1), but again, the
dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.92) was more
pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean
dierence of 0.58; t[124] 12.97, p5 0.0001).
For confidence in expectations and for the recall data, we contrasted morality-
informative targets (i.e. moral and immoral targets combined) against intelligence-
informative targets. Results again supported the morality-importance hypothesis.
First, although both morality and intelligence information led participants to express
greater confidence than neutral information (see Table 1), this eect was more
pronounced for morality than for intelligence. Participants expressed more confid-
ence in expectations based on morality information (a mean dierence of 0.58), than
on intelligence information (a mean dierence of 0.23; t[123] 8.21, p5 0.0001).
Second, there was a clear recall advantage for morality information: Morality
information was recalled better (a mean dierence of 0.71) than intelligence
information (a mean dierence of 0.40; t[123] 12.54, p5 0.0001). As can be seen
in Table 1, morality information was recalled better than neutral information,
whereas this was not the case for intelligence information (see Table 1). In fact, recall
of intelligence information was at about the same level as recall of neutral
information.
Tests of Evaluative Asymmetries
Morality eects The negativity eect hypothesis stated that dierences between
targets described by immoral versus neutral behavior would be more pronounced
Table 1. Results of analyses of variance with Target as a 5-level within-participant factor,
together with the mean scores on the dependent measures for the five target types and the
results of post hoc contrast tests
Means per target type
Dependent measure Target F Moral Immoral Intelligent Unintelligent Neutral
Global impression 392.38*** 1.32e ÿ1.42a 0.74d 0.50b 0.33c
Expected cooperation 185.85*** 2.59c 0.47a 1.85b 1.85b 1.79b
Own cooperation 103.89*** 2.34e 0.42a 1.79d 1.22b 1.63c
Dierence expected-own
cooperation
14.63*** 0.25b 0.05a 0.05a 0.63c 0.16b
Confidence in
expectations
26.06*** 0.56c 0.62c 0.26b 0.21b ÿ0.02a
Proportion of recalled
behaviors
48.17*** 0.68c 0.74c 0.42ab 0.37a 0.49b
Note: Global impressions and confidence ratings were made on 5-point scales ranging from ÿ2 to 2;
higher scores indicate more positive ratings. Expected and own cooperation (and the dierence between
them) are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4. Proportion of recalled behaviors were
computed for each target category separately. All df 4,121, except for confidence ratings df 4,120.
Means in the same row that do not share subscripts dier at p5 0.05.
***p5 0.0001.
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than dierences between targets described by moral versus neutral behavior, for
global impressions, expected cooperation, and own cooperation. This hypothesis
received strong support. For global impressions, the absolute dierence between
immoral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.74) was more pronounced than
the absolute dierence between moral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.00;
t[124] 9.55, p5 0.0001). Also, for expected cooperation, the absolute dierence
between immoral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.32) was more pro-
nounced than the absolute dierence between moral and neutral targets (a mean
dierence of 0.80; t[124] 5.98, p5 0.0001). And finally, for own cooperation, the
absolute dierence between immoral and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 1.21)
was more pronounced than the absolute dierence between moral and neutral targets
(a mean dierence of 0.71; t[124] 5.94, p5 0.0001). As can be seen in Table 1, no
negativity eects for morality were found for confidence in expectations or for recall
of behaviors. Immoral information did not lead to more confidence than moral
information, and immoral behaviors were not recalled better than moral behaviors.
Intelligence eects We investigated possible negativity or positivity eects for intel-
ligence in an exploratory way. Negativity eects for intelligence were found on global
impressions and own cooperation. For impressions, the absolute dierence between
unintelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.83) was more pronounced
than the absolute dierence between intelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence
of 0.41; t[124] 6.43, p5 0.0001). For own cooperation, the absolute dierence
between unintelligent and neutral targets (a mean dierence of 0.41) was also more
pronounced than the absolute dierence between intelligent and neutral targets
(a mean dierence of 0.17; t[124] 3.00, p5 0.003). Because intelligence did not
aect expected cooperation, dierences between unintelligent and neutral, and
intelligent and neutral targets did not dier (mean dierences of 0.05 and 0.06,
respectively; t 0.03, n.s.). As can be seen in Table 1, there were no evaluative
asymmetries for intelligence in confidence ratings or recall: Intelligent and unintel-
ligent information led to similar levels of confidence, and similar levels of recall.
Dierences between Expected and Own Cooperation
An interesting additional finding was that participants overall expected more
cooperation than they were willing to display themselves (see Table 1; F[1,124]
35.34, p5 0.0001). To investigate whether this tendency was stronger for some targets
than for others, we analyzed the dierences between expected and own cooperation
(relative benefit). As can be seen in Table 1, relative benefit was largest for unintel-
ligent targets, somewhat smaller for moral and neutral targets, and smallest for
immoral and intelligent targets. These results suggest, first, a tendency for partici-
pants to take advantage of unintelligent targets relative to all other targets, and
second, a tendency to take advantage of moral and neutral targets relative to
intelligent and immoral targets. The small dierence between expected and own
cooperation for immoral targets could be due to a floor eect. Participants expected
so little cooperation from these targets that they could hardly be less cooperative
themselves. However, the large relative benefit for unintelligent targets cannot be
explained by a floor eect.
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STUDY 2
The results of Study 1 support both the morality-importance and the negativity eects
hypotheses. First, morality information had stronger overall eects on global
impressions, expectations of other’s cooperation, and own cooperation, and led to
greater confidence in expectations and better recall than intelligence information.
Intelligence behaviors were recalled poorly, suggesting that intelligence information
was not processed very thoroughly. Also, intelligence information did not aect levels
of expected cooperation. However, we did find higher confidence ratings for
intelligence information than for neutral information, suggesting that participants
found intelligence information—to some extent—useful in deriving expectations.
Second, we found negativity eects for morality information on global impressions
and cooperation expected and displayed. Unlike previous research, we also found
negativity eects for intelligence on global impressions and own cooperation. Finally,
participants overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display
themselves. Interestingly, this tendency to increase relative benefit was especially
strong for unintelligent and for moral (and neutral) targets. This seems to suggest
that, at least in this single-interaction context, participants tended to take advantage
of these types of targets.
We conducted a second study to further investigate the morality-importance and
negativity eect hypotheses and the findings pertaining to relative benefit. An
important modification in comparison with the first study was that in this second
study, we provided participants with information about both morality and intel-
ligence of target persons. In most impression formation studies (and in our first
study), the information participants receive about a target person generally pertains
to only one dimension. However, in everyday life situations, people often have
information about more than one attribute of a person. Besides being more realistic,
the design of the second study also enabled us to explore the conjoint eects of
morality and intelligence.
Method
Overview
The procedure was essentially the same as in Study l. First, we explained the social
dilemma task and checked participants’ comprehension. Again, participants could
consult a table containing the 5 5 payo matrix throughout the experiment.
Participants engaged in the task with targets described by two behaviors, one either
high, neutral, or low in morality, and the other either high, neutral, or low in
intelligence, allowing for nine dierent target types. After a filler task, an unexpected
free recall task of the behavioral descriptions was administered. Again, the experiment
was run self-paced on personal computers in individual cubicles. The same dependent
variables were used as in Study 1.
Participants and Design
A total of 164 students at the Free University of Amsterdam (99 female, 65 male),
recruited by means of an advertisement in the university newspaper, participated in
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this study. They were paid for participation. The within-participants design included
morality of other (moral versus morality-neutral versus immoral) and intelligence of
other (intelligent versus intelligence-neutral unintelligent) as within-participant
factors.
Procedure
Study 2 employed the same procedure as Study l, except that participants received two
behavioral items per target person instead of one. The same behavioral descriptions
were used as in Study 1. Morality behaviors were combined with intelligence beha-
viors, producing targets of nine dierent types: moral/intelligent, moral/neutral,
moral/unintelligent, neutral/intelligent, neutral/neutral, neutral/unintelligent, immor-
al/intelligent, immoral/neutral, and immoral/unintelligent. Participants were paired
with 18 targets, two of each type, the order of which was randomized separately for
each participant. Two additional neutral behaviors, selected from the pretest
described in the method of Study 1, formed a practice target that was presented
first in all versions and excluded from the analyses. Again, we attempted to diminish
the possibility that specific characteristics of the behaviors would have unforeseen
influences on the results. First, two dierent sets of targets were constructed by using
each behavior in dierent cells of the design in two versions. For instance, in one
version a moral behavior was combined with an intelligent behavior, whereas in the
other version the same moral behavior was combined with an unintelligent or a
neutral behavior. Also, target gender was again varied systematically. Counter-
balanced with other variations, half of the targets were male in one version and female
in another version, and vice versa.
The morality behavior and the intelligence behavior of a target person were
presented on the same screen. Counterbalanced across other variations, for half of the
participants, the morality behavior was displayed first; for the other half, the
intelligence behavior was displayed first. Finally, as in Study 1, order (impression
ratings first versus social dilemma first) was varied systematically. Preliminary
analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects including order, gender of partici-
pants, target set, target gender version, or type of behavior displayed first. Hence,
these variables will not be further discussed.
At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to write down all behaviors
they could remember in words as close as possible to the original formulation. For
this purpose, they received three sheets of paper containing a total of 21 blank boxes.
They were asked to write down the two behaviors of the same person together in one
box, giving each person his or her ‘own box’ (i.e. if they remembered only one
behavior of a person, they should write only one behavior in that box). In doing so,
we were able to investigate not only the type of behaviors that participants recalled
but also the type of target person they recalled. Participants were told that there were
more boxes than there had been persons, so that they would not be able to fill in all
boxes. Participants spent at least 7 and maximally 14 minutes completing this task.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures included expected and own cooperation (none through four
points), the dierence between these two, confidence in expectations (ÿ2 very
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unconfident, 2 very confident), global impressions (ÿ2 very negative, 2 very
positive), the proportion of moral, immoral, intelligent, unintelligent, and neutral
behaviors recalled, and the proportion of correctly recalled complete targets.
Results and Discussion
For all dependent measures, except for free recall of behaviors, we analyzed mean
scores across the two targets per category. The means for the nine target types are
displayed in Table 2, together with results of post-hoc contrast tests. For the recall
data, the units of analysis were, first, the proportion of correctly recalled behaviors
per behavior category, and second, the proportion of correctly recalled complete
targets per target category. These data were subjected to analyses of variance with
morality and intelligence as within-participant factors. The results of these analyses
are displayed in Table 3,5 together with the mean scores for all dependent measures
across moral, morality-neutral, immoral, intelligent, intelligence-neutral, and
unintelligent targets (which are more directly relevant to the hypotheses). As can
be seen, the results are very similar to those of Study l. We found main eects for
morality and intelligence on almost all dependent measures, the only exception again
being that intelligence did not aect expectations. Again, targets described by positive
behavior generally elicited more favourable impressions, and made participants
expect and display greater levels of cooperation than targets described by negative
behavior. Also, confidence ratings were higher for targets described by informative
versus neutral behaviors, and morality information was recalled better than neutral
and intelligence information. As in Study 1, we addressed the morality-importance
and the negativity eect hypotheses by computing a priori contrasts, again setting
alpha at 0.01 to avoid capitalization on chance eects.
The Importance of Morality
First, as predicted by the morality-importance hypothesis, dierences between moral
and immoral targets were more pronounced than dierences between intelligent and
unintelligent targets, for global impressions (mean dierences of 2.08 versus 0.55;
t[163] 24.37, p5 0.0001), expected cooperation (mean dierences of 1.74 versus
5As can be seen in Table 3, the analyses revealed significant interaction eects for global impressions, own
cooperation, relative benefit and the proportion of target persons recalled. For global impressions and own
cooperation, this interaction is probably due to the impact of negative morality information: For own
cooperation, intelligence has a strong eect for morality-neutral targets, a weaker eect for moral targets,
and no eect for immoral targets (see Table 2 for means). Global impressions show a similar pattern, albeit
less pronounced. Apparently, the impact of morality information, especially if negative, attenuates
intelligence eects. These findings are consistent with both the morality-importance and the negativity
eect hypothesis.
For recall of target persons, the pattern of means shows that recall of immoral targets is large, except for
unintelligent/immoral targets. This is consistent with behavioral-adaptive reasoning, as unintelligent
targets probably imply no danger. Also, the pattern of means shows that morality-neutral/intelligence-
neutral targets are recalled better than either morality-neutral/intelligent targets or morality-neutral/
unintelligent targets, which is consistent with the results of Study 1.
Finally, the interaction pattern for the dierence between expected and own cooperation shows that this
relative benefit is largest by far for unintelligent targets as long as they are not immoral. This finding will be
discussed further in the text.
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0.05; t[163] 17.80, p5 0.0001), and own cooperation (mean dierences of 1.42
versus 0.24; t[163] 16.37, p5 0.0001). Another way in which the importance of
morality was revealed is in the comparison of the two evaluatively ambiguous targets,
that is, moral/unintelligent and immoral/intelligent targets (see Table 2). As can be
seen, moral/unintelligent targets are consistently evaluated and approached more
favourably than immoral/intelligent targets. As both targets are described positively
on one dimension and negatively on the other, it is clear that the evaluative meaning
of the morality information determines most strongly how the target is evaluated and
approached.
Second, participants overall expressed greater confidence in expectations if morality
information was present (all targets except morality-neutral targets) than if intel-
ligence information was present (all targets except intelligence-neutral targets); means
were 0.63 versus 0.50 t[162] 8.33, p5 0.0001). Furthermore, morality behaviors
were recalled better than intelligence behaviors (mean proportions were 0.53 versus
0.38; t[161] 11.03, p5 0.0001). Also, complete targets (i.e. joint recall of both
behaviors of a target) were recalled better if morality information about them was
present than if intelligence information about them was present (mean proportions
were 0.18 versus 0.15; t[161] 4.11, p5 0.0001). These results provide strong support
for the morality-importance hypothesis.
Evaluative Asymmetries
Morality eects As in Study 1, the negativity eect hypothesis received strong
support. Dierences between targets described by immoral versus neutral behavior
were greater than dierences between targets described by moral versus neutral
behavior, for global impressions (mean dierences were 1.38 and 0.71, respectively;
t[163] 12.09, p5 0.0001), expected cooperation (mean dierences of 1.07 versus
Table 2. Means for all nine target types on the dependent measures
Target type
Dependent measure
Mor
Int
Mor+
Int
Morÿ
Int
Mor
Int+
Mor+
Int+
Morÿ
Int+
Mor
Intÿ
Mor+
Intÿ
Morÿ
Intÿ
Global impression 1.28g 0.70e ÿ0.97b 1.16f 0.40d ÿ0.95b 0.67e ÿ0.11c ÿ1.22a
Expected cooperation 2.44c 1.80b 0.75a 2.43c 1.86b 0.74a 2.58c 1.80b 0.74a
Own cooperation 2.13e 1.66c 0.66a 2.07de 1.66c 0.65a 1.93d 1.26b 0.56a
Dierence exp-own
cooperation
0.30b 0.13a 0.09a 0.36b 0.20ab 0.09a 0.65c 0.55c 0.18ab
Confidence in
expectations
0.59cd 0.13ab 0.70d 0.48c 0.09a 0.63cd 0.65d 0.26b 0.75d
Proportion of
recalled targets
0.15ab 0.11ab 0.24cd 0.13ab 0.26d 0.26cd 0.18bc 0.15ab 0.09a
Note: Mormoral; Mor+ neutral; Morÿ immoral; Int intelligent; Int+ neutral;
Intÿ unintelligent. Global impressions and confidence ratings were made on 5-point scales ranging
from ÿ2 to 2; higher scores indicate more positive ratings. Expected and own cooperation (and the
dierence between them) are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4. Proportions of recalled
target persons were computed for each target category separately. Means in the same row that do not share
subscripts dier at p5 0.01.
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Table 3. Results of 3 (Morality) 3 (Intelligence) analyses of variance, and means on the dependent measures computed across moral, morality-
neutral, immoral, intelligent, intelligence-neutral, and unintelligent targets
F Targets varying in Morality Targets varying in Intelligence
Dependent measure
Moralitya Intelligencea Morality
Intelligenceb
Moral Morality-
neutral
Immoral Intelligent Intelligence-
neutral
Unintelligent
Global impression 680.55*** 131.02*** 17.36*** 1.04c 0.33b ÿ1.04a 0.34c 0.21b ÿ0.22a
Expected cooperation 314.09*** 51 1.83 2.48c 1.82b 0.74a 1.66a 1.68a 1.71a
Own cooperation 198.55*** 22.72*** 4.85** 2.05c 1.53b 0.63a 1.49b 1.46b 1.25a
Dierence expected own
cooperation
17.29*** 22.02*** 4.83** 0.44c 0.29b 0.12a 0.17a 0.22a 0.46b
Confidence in
expectations
80.21*** 9.19*** 51 0.57b 0.16a 0.69b 0.47ab 0.40a 0.55b
Proportion of recalled
behaviorsc
51.93*** 6.14** N.A. 0.51b 0.37a 0.55b 0.41b 0.37ab 0.34a
Proportion of recalled
target persons
4.70* 14.93*** 14.92*** 0.15a 0.17ab 0.20b 0.17a 0.22b 0.14a
Note: Global impressions and confidence ratings were made on 5-point scales ranging from ÿ2 to 2; higher scores indicate more positive ratings Expected and own
cooperation (and the dierence between them) are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a nd a maximum of 4. Proportions of recalled behaviors were computed for each
behavior category separately; proportions of recalled target persons were computed for each target category separately. adf 2,162. bdf 4,160. cseparate ANOVAs per
dimension, df 2,160.
Due to missing values, degrees of freedom are based on N 163 for confidence ratings and N 162 for recall data.
Means in the same row and pertaining to the same dimension that do not share subscripts dier at least at p5 0.05.
*p5 0.05. **p5 0.005. ***p5 0.0001.
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0.66; t[163] 6.52, p5 0.0001), and own cooperation (mean dierences of 0.90 versus
0.52; t[163] 6.41, p5 0.0001).
Again, no negativity eects obtained on confidence ratings and recall of behaviors;
however, we did find a negativity eect for recall of target persons. As can be seen in
Table 3, participants did not express greater confidence in expectations based on
immoral versus moral information, and they did not recall individual immoral
behaviors better than moral behaviors. However, complete target persons were
recalled better when they were immoral rather than moral.
Intelligence eects For intelligence, results were also similar to those obtained in
Study 1. Negativity eects were found on global impressions and own cooperation.
Dierences between targets described by unintelligent versus neutral behavior were
greater than dierences between targets described by intelligent versus neutral beha-
vior, for global impressions (mean dierences were 0.42 versus 0.13; t[163] 6.65,
p5 0.0001), and own cooperation (mean dierences were 0.21 versus 0.03;
t[163] 3.30, p5 0.002). Again, intelligence did not aect expected cooperation.
No evaluative asymmetries for intelligence were found on confidence ratings or on
the proportion of correctly recalled target persons, but this time, we did find an
asymmetry for recall of individual behaviors. Intelligent behaviors were recalled
better than unintelligent behaviors (see Table 3).
The Dierence between Expected and Own Cooperation
As in Study l, we explored whether the dierences between the expected level of
cooperation and the level of cooperation displayed varied with target type. Again, we
found that participants expected more cooperation than they were willing to display
themselves. As can be seen in Table 3, relative benefit was largest for moral targets
relative to morality-neutral and immoral targets, and for unintelligent targets relative
to intelligent and intelligence-neutral targets. Looking at the means in Table 2, it can
be seen that relative benefit is by far largest for moral/unintelligent and for morality-
neutral/unintelligent targets, suggesting that participants were inclined to increase
their relative benefit most with those unintelligent targets who were not immoral.
However, as in Study 1, the small relative benefit with immoral targets could result
from a floor eect, for participants again expected so little cooperation from these
targets that they could hardly be less cooperative themselves.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research examined how we use evaluative person information pertaining
to morality and intelligence in forming impressions of people, anticipating the
cooperativeness of their behavior, and deciding how cooperatively we will behave
ourselves. Two experiments supported hypotheses regarding the importance of
morality information and the weight given to negative information. These results
enhance our understanding of impression formation processes and their interactional
consequences in a two-person mixed-motive interdependence situation (a social
dilemma).
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The Importance of Morality
Consistent with the morality-importance hypothesis, impressions, expectations of
other’s cooperation, and own cooperative behavior in a social dilemma are more
strongly influenced by morality information than by intelligence information. In
addition, people express greater confidence in expectations based on morality rather
than intelligence information, suggesting that morality is more relevant to behavior in
this situation. Finally, morality information is recalled better than intelligence
information.
In the introduction, we discussed why morality may have such a prominent mean-
ing in a mixed-motive interdependence situation. Morality information is informative
of a person’s good or bad intentions with respect to other people, and therefore useful
for inferring whether we can trust this person to be cooperative and, hence, whether
we can safely choose to be cooperative ourselves without being exploited. Intelligence
information, on the other hand, is less indicative of the trustworthiness of another
person. Indeed, we did not find intelligence to aect expectations—although we did
find that intelligence information was considered more useful for deriving expecta-
tions of another’s cooperation than neutral information (as reflected in greater
confidence ratings). It may well be that most people thought it intelligent to cooperate
in a mixed-motive situation, in order to get the best outcomes for all, whereas others
considered it intelligent to try and get the best outcomes for self by taking a ‘free ride’.
An important question is whether morality is generally more important in person
impressions than intelligence. The greater recall of morality over intelligence
information, for example, may be due to dierences in attention, weighting, and
processing caused by this particular interdependence choice task (the social dilemma).
However, one might also argue that the recall advantage for morality information is
not contingent to this particular context, but reflects a general tendency for people to
be more interested in morality than intelligence. In fact, empirical evidence suggests
that this might well be the case (cf. Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski,
in press). At the same time, this tendency most probably finds its origins in interaction
situations. For example, many real-world social situations involve a choice between
one’s own good and collective considerations, and therefore, inferring whether or not
you can trust a person to do what is best for all (and hence, for you) is of paramount
importance. So, someone’s social, other-profitable characteristics will almost always
receive more attention and weight in a judgment of the person than self-profitable,
competence-related characteristics, as the latter are of less hedonic relevance for the
perceiver (see Wojciszke, 1994). (Exceptions, of course, are situations in which a
competence-related judgment is expected.) Furthermore, socially evaluative infor-
mation may have a broader meaning than intelligence information, such that, to a
certain degree, the latter can be deduced from the former. People are more ready to
conclude that a moral person is intelligent, or that an immoral person is unintelligent,
than the opposite.6 This is congruent with behavioral-adaptive reasoning. For
6We found additional support for this claim by asking 14 participants to rate the intelligence of a moral
person and an immoral person, and to rate the morality of an intelligent and an unintelligent person, on
7-point scales. Intelligence inferences from morality information were more extreme than morality
inferences from intelligence information (1.46 versus 1.21; 1 scale midpoint, 4 scale extreme;
t[13] 2.19, p5 0.05). Also, participants who indicated that they could not draw morality inferences
from intelligence information (i.e. who chose the scale midpoint for the latter two questions) reported to be
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example, people who display immoral behavior risk expulsion from the social group
that could protect them (Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Also, immoral behavior is unlikely to
result in superior long-term outcomes (e.g. Axelrod, 1984). So, in a sense, (im)moral
behavior to some extent implies (un)intelligence.
Negativity Eects in an Interaction Context
The current research also revealed evidence in support of the negativity eect
hypothesis. Impressions and cooperative behavior expected and displayed are more
strongly influenced by negative than by positive morality information, compared with
neutral information. The finding that these negativity eects for morality information
extend to behavioral expectations and own behavior is congruent with the idea that
attending to socially negative information is important from an interaction perspec-
tive, as claimed by motivational explanations for negativity eects (e.g. Peeters &
Czapinski, 1990; cf. De Dreu et al., 1995). Attending to negative, ‘dangerous’ person
characteristics like immorality is especially functional in an interdependence
situation, where these characteristics can actually exert their detrimental eects.
We also found negativity eects for intelligence information on global impressions
and own cooperative behavior, unlike previous research that demonstrated positivity
eects in this domain (e.g. Reeder & Fulks, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).7
These negativity eects seem to have a dierent meaning. Although no dierences in
cooperation are expected from intelligent, intelligence-neutral, and unintelligent
people, the latter are still evaluated extremely negatively and receive very little
cooperation. The use people make of intelligence information is best discussed by
looking at the dierences between expected and own cooperation.
Taking More Advantage of Some People than of Others
A general finding was that people overall expect to receive more cooperation than they
are willing to display, a tendency we have referred to as relative benefit. One might
speculate that this tendency is fostered by the single-interaction nature of the current
interdependence situation, as the other person will not be able to retaliate. Of course,
we do not mean to conclude that people are always ready to deliberately and con-
sciously take advantage of other people whenever possible. Probably, people would
label their own behavior as cautious rather than exploitative, as one can never be sure
of what the other does. However, it is striking that certain person characteristics
more confident about their answers than participants who did draw morality inferences from intelligence
information (i.e. who did not choose the scale midpoint for these questions; 6.25 versus 4.75; 1 very
unconfident, 7 very confident; t[12] 2.87, p5 0.05).
7It might be argued that our method of using neutral, irrelevant information as a standard for comparison
is more likely to produce negativity eects than a method that tests evaluative asymmetries against a zero
scale point (for instance, if behavioral items, pretested to be equally extreme positive and negative on
morality, are rated on a likability scale, e.g. Fiske, 1980; or if pretested items are combined and this new
stimulus is rated as a whole, e.g. Coovert & Reeder, 1990), because neutral information tends to be
perceived as somewhat positive compared to a zero scale point. However, this does not decrease the
importance of our findings: compared with irrelevant, neutral information, negative information has more
impact than positive information.
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promote the tendency to increase one’s relative benefit to the other. Also, it is worth
noting that these eects were conjured up by only one or two descriptions of the
behavior of a person.
As we have seen, relative to other targets, unintelligent targets elicited very little
cooperation. This is consistent with other findings (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994;
Van Lange & Semin-Goossens, 1998) showing that, when interdependent with
unintelligent others, quite a few people try to obtain the best possible outcome for
themselves, even if that means anticipating poor outcomes for the other. This finding
cannot be accounted for by low levels of expected cooperation, as intelligence did not
aect expectations. It is also not due to uncertainty of what an unintelligent person
would do. In Study 2, we even found confidence ratings to be greater—albeit not
significantly so—for unintelligent than for intelligent target persons. Similarly,
relative benefit is large for moral targets, from whom high levels of cooperation were
expected with relatively high confidence.
Instead, the tendency to increase relative benefit with unintelligent or moral people
seems to suggest that these types of person information might be important partly
from an opportunistic point of view, providing information about whether or not a
person can be ‘safely’ taken advantage of. Just as personality information can inform
us about the trustworthiness of someone (‘can I trust this person?’), it can also be
informative about someone’s trustfulness (‘will this person trust me?’). It may be that
moral people are perceived as very trustful because of their faith in others and
unintelligent people because of their innocence (see Deutsch, 1973, pp. 146–147). In
addition, these people may be perceived as relatively powerless: Moral people are not
expected to do bad, immoral things to others (cf. Reeder & Spores, 1986; Reeder &
Coovert, 1983; Reeder, Pryor, & Wojciszke, 1992), and unintelligent people are
probably not able to do so. Thus, unintelligent and moral people may be perceived as
both cooperative and harmless, and therefore ‘exploitable’. Clearly, these intriguing
yet complex issues concerning the possible mechanisms underlying relative benefit—
why people do not fully reciprocate levels of expected cooperation—deserve further
empirical attention. In the meantime, it is interesting to note that, generally, motiva-
tional theories only stress the functionality of attending to possible negative
consequences of environmental stimuli, including other persons. However, the ability
to discern and pursue positive outcomes obviously has survival value too. Note that
both tendencies are reflected in recall of the target persons: ‘dangerous’ intelligent/
immoral or intelligence-neutral/immoral persons and ‘exploitable’ moral/unintelli-
gent persons are recalled best.
Strengths and Limitations
Before closing, we should briefly outline strengths and limitations of the current
research, as well as some issues for future research. One limitation is that we have
employed the same single-trial social dilemma in both studies. This task represents
only one type of interdependence context, and one in which the possible behavioral
repertoire is rather limited (cf. Kelley, 1984; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996). Indeed, it
would be fruitful for future research to examine dierent interdependence situations,
for instance in the form of iterated social dilemmas, or real-life interdependence
situations. These could, for example, investigate patterns of interaction sequences, or
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interaction situations that permit coordination between individuals. Nevertheless,
social dilemma tasks form a useful point of departure for future research. First, they
allow for studying ‘conflict without tears’ (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977, p. 366). Second,
abstractness of outcomes (points) and anonymity enable us to study basic motivations
in an ethical manner. A social dilemma is an appropriate research tool for invest-
igating these basic behavioral tendencies and social motivations. Ultimately, these
basic motivations—the human dispositions to try to get the best and escape the
worst—shape all of our behaviors, most importantly our interactions with other
people.
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APPENDIX: THE BEHAVIORAL DESCRIPTIONS USED IN THE
TWO STUDIES
Moral Behaviors
When his mother told him that his grandfather was ill, he got on his bicycle at once in
order to pay him a visit.
When an old lady, who was a bad walker, entered the bus, he stood up immediately
and asked her if she wanted to sit down.
When a friend, who was sad because her boyfriend had ended their relationship,
called him up, he went to her straight away in order to cheer her up.
He spontaneously oered to do the shopping for his neighbour, who had the flu
and could not go outside.
When his girlfriend made ready to do the dishes, he said that he would do them
because she had already been very busy today.
When he found a purse with a lot of money in it, he took it back to the owner
without hesitation.
Immoral Behaviors
When he saw that an old lady fell on the pavement, he quickly walked on before she
could ask him if he would help her.
When dining out with his colleagues, he purposely chose something expensive from
the menu, because they would split the check.
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In the supermarket, he pushed a woman with a perambulator aside in order to get
to the check–out before her.
When his neighbour had the flu and asked him to do some shopping for her, he
lied, telling her that he was unable to do it because he had an appointment.
When he found a purse with a lot of money in it, he kept the money and threw away
the purse.
When an old lady, who was a bad walker, entered the bus, he looked the other way
so that he did not need to stand up.
Intelligent Behaviors
He had prepared himself so well for the job interview, that he could express himself
without any diculty.
In the classroom, he answered a question correctly to which no one else knew the
answer.
He wrote a letter to the municipality that had exactly the right tone, and therefore
he was granted a house rather quickly.
He solved a problem about which his friends had been thinking all day in less than
15 minutes.
He wrote such a good master’s thesis, that he won a scholarship that enabled him to
study abroad for a year.
When he saw that his direct supervisor was in a very bad mood, he decided to go
and talk about a salary raise some other time.
Unintelligent Behaviors
He began to talk about a salary raise when it was clear that his employer was in a very
bad mood.
When a business company asked him via his study advisor to work for them, he
accepted the job without inquiring what kind of work it involved.
Although the bright light of the sun was troubling him very much, he left the
shutters open, because he did not know how to close them.
Although he performed the written driving-test for the fourth time already, he
failed again.
When it became clear that his first stack of tickets had not won him a prize, he
bought another stack of two hundred lottery tickets.
When he heard somebody say that one did not have to study the first six chapters,
he took this for granted and so he failed the exam.
Neutral Behaviors
Because the film he was watching was terribly dull, he fell asleep on the sofa.
After having doubted for a moment whether he would buy chipolata pudding or
toee-flavoured custard, he chose the custard.
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When he discovered a hole in one of his socks while getting dressed, he took
another pair from the wardrobe.
When he came home from work he first checked whether there was any mail, and
then read the newspaper.
In August, he took three weeks o in order to go on a holiday.
He was more than an hour late for work, because his train was delayed due to an
accident.
The first time he happened upon the new ten-guilders coin, he looked at it in
surprise.
During lunch break he talked with a fellow student, who told him about a television
program of the night before.
Because it was extremely busy in the tram during rush hour, he had to put up with a
stand.
Because he had an adverse wind, it took him five minutes longer to get to work than
usual.
After having watched the news, he checked whether there were any interesting
programs on other channels.
Just before closing time, he quickly went to the supermarket to buy a carton of milk
and a package of coee.
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